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difficult, and makes larger demands upon the ready learning and
mental resources, of the profession, than that which has come into
vogue in the American courts, where the counsel sometimes prepares a brief of fifty or more closely printed pages, and feels bound
to read, if not to discuss, the whole extent of it before the court.
Under such circumstances he feels himself almost unfairly treated
if the court interrupt him by impertinent questions, and he
naturally supposes that they are becoming impatient. The court
have no alternative but to sit quietly, and endeavor to keep up
the appearance of listening.
The arguments before the Law Lords, on appeals to the
House of Lords, are more formal, and less conversational, than in
most of the other English courts. But there is one practice at
the English bar which tends very much to increase the interest of
law arguments-the same counsel very seldom reargue a cause,
I. F. R.
either in the same or an appellate court.

RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Maine.
ELLEN WILSON v. GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY CO 1PANY.
The holder of a railway passenger ticket is only entitled to passage with such
personal baggage as he carries with him at the time. Baggage sent by an after
train will be at his risk, and not that of the company.
APPLETON, C. J.-The plaintiff was a passenger on board the
defendants' cars, having seasonably paid her fare. Her baggage
was not with her, it having been left behind without any fault of
the defendants. Some two or three days afterwards it was left in
the charge of their servants to be transported to the Empire station, on their line, but it never reached its place of destination.
This suit is brought to recover the value of the baggage lost.
The presiding judge instructed the jury, "that, if they should
find that the plaintiff went on board the defendants' road as a
passenger on Tuesday preceding without baggage, and that the
trunk and its contents were ordinary personal baggage, such as a
passenger would be entitled to take without extra charge, it was
not necessary there should be proof that anything was paid for
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carrying the trunk between the same points; that the price paid
by the plaintiff for her own passage, and the evidence inthe case,
if found to be true, were sufficient consideration for the promise
alleged in the writ."
As the plaintiff's trunk was taken for transportation some days
after she had passed over the defendants' road, the substance of
the charge of the presiding judge was, that the price paid by the
plaintiff for her ticket included the compensation due to the
defendants for their subsequent transportation of her trunk-the
trunk and its contents being personal baggage. In other words,
it whs not necessary that the baggage of the passenger should go
with the passenger, but that it might be forwarded subsequently
and without any additional charge for its freight.
The fare for the passenger includes compensation for the carriage of his baggage, as to which the carriers of passengers are
to be regarded as common carriers. There need be no distinct
contract for the carriage of the baggage. The fare of the passenger covers the compensation for the freight of the baggage.
The baggage must be ordinary baggage, such as a traveller takes
with him for his personal comfort, convenience, or pleasure for
the journey. It must be the "ordinary baggage" of a traveller,
regard being had to the journey proposed.
It is implied in the contract that the baggage and the passenger
go together. "The general habits and wants of mankind," observes ERLE, C. J., in Phelps v. L. and N. IF. Ralway Co., 115
E. C. L. 327, "must be taken to be in the mind of carrier when
he receives a passenger for conveyance; and the law makes him
responsible for all such things as may be fairly carried by the passenger for his personal use." In Cahillv. L. and N. TIF. ailway
Co., 100 E. C. L. 172, WILLES, J., says: "Where a passenger
takes a ticket at the ordinary charge, he must, according to common sense and common experience, be taken to contract with the
railway company for the carriage of himself and his personal
luggage only; and that he no more extends the contract to the
conveyance of a single package of merchandise than of his entire
worldly possessions." In Smith v. Railroad Co., 44 N. H. 330,
BELLOWS, J., uses the following language: "Until. a comparatively recent period, the English courts were inclined to hold that
carriers of passengers by stage-coaches and otherwise, were not
liable for injuries to their baggage, unless a distinct price was paid
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for its transportation. But it is now well settled that the price
paid for the passenger includes also the personal baggage required
for his personal accommodation; the custody of the baggage
being regarded as accessory to the principal contract. * * In
general terms it may include not only personal apparel, but other
conveniences for the journey, such as a passenger usually htas with
"The baggage," observes
him for his personal accommodation."
MULLIN, J., in .3erm7l v. G-rinnell, 30 N. Y. 619, "must be such
as is necessary for the particular journey that the passenger is, at
the time of the employment of the carrier, actually making."
It follows from the nature and object of the contract that-the
right of the passenger is limited to the baggage required for his
pleasure, convenience, and necessity during the journey. As it
is for his use and convenience, it must necessarily be with him as
it is for him. He may reasonably be expected to exercise some
supervision over it during and be ready to receive it at the expiration of his journey. In the present case the baggage of the
plaintiff was forwarded two days after she had passed over the
road. If its transmission may be delayed two days and the carrier is required to take it without any compensation save the fare
paid by the passenger who: had preceded it, it may equally be
delayed weeks or months, and the carrier be required to forward
it without any additional pay. It presents a different question
when the delay is caused by the fault of the carrier or there is a
special agreement with him or his agent for the subsequent transportation of the passenger's baggage.
The fare paid by the passenger over a railroad is the compensation for his carriage and for the transportation, at the same time,
of such baggage as he may require for his personal convenience,
pleasure, and necessity during his journey. Baggage subsequently
forwarded by his direction, in the absence of any special agreement with the carrier or of negligence on his part, is liable, like
any- article of merchandise, to the payment of .the usual freight.
%
Exceptions sustained.
The foregoing opinion unquestionably
places the cascupon thetrueground-that
in the absence of all contract or consent
,n part of a railway company, they are
under no additional duty or obligation to
a passeuger by reaz-on of his purchase of

his ticket beyond that of safely carrying
him to the point indicated on the ticket,
together with such personal baggage as
he may find it fox his convenience to
carry with him, not exceeding the limit
fixed by the rules and regulations of the
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company. There can be no possible
question that, aside from special circumstances indicating the actual or implied
consent of the company to allow the baggage of the passenger to go upon a different train from that on which the passenger himself goes, there is no obligation
whatever to carry the baggage at all,
except in the usual mode for special compensation. It is of the very essence of
the implied stipulation on the part of the
company to carry a reasonable amount of
personal baggage with their passengers,
that it shall go upon the same train with
them. The care which the passenger himself exercises over the baggage is of the
greatest importance to its security. In
England, when the passenger changes
from one main line to a branch line, in
order to reach another main line, he is
always expected to point out his baggage,
and if he do not, is specially inquired of
if he have any, and if so, requested to
point it out, and if he fail to, do it, is sure
to fail of finding his luggage at the end
of his route. Under such circumstances
there would not be the slightest safety
in trusting luggage to go by any mere
passenger train without some one to look
after it. Perhaps this uncertainty is
somewhat peculiar to England, or the
United Kingdom of Great Britain, since
here the companies never give any check
for luggage, as they call it, while upon
the Continent the companies all give
formal receipts or bills of lading for
baggage, and cheeks are also given by
our companies which have the same
force.
This consideration of giving a check
or bill for the baggage is of some importance in regard to the responsibility of the
companies. As a general thilng, railway
companies never do this, except in connection with a ticket for passage. In all
other cases, the baggage must go by express, or by the parcels office, as the expresses are called in Europe. We think
most railway companies would scout the
VOL. XVTI.-26
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idea of sending baggage by passenger
trains, separate from the passengers, as
the height of absurdity, unless, perhaps,
where the company had been in fault in
not forwarding it ai the proper time, or
by having sent it in the wrong direction. But there is no doubt it would be
entirely competent for the company to
assume a special undertaking of this
character. And where the servants of
the company, being informed of the fact
that the passenger did not intend going
by the same train, in consequence of being delayed, or having gone before, or
for any other reason, understandingly
accept baggage, to go in the passenger
train, without any accompanying passenger, we are not prepared to say that
the payment of the price of transportation should make any difference in regard to the duty or responsibility of the
company. It is hardly to be supposed
that the company would undertake any
such office as a mere gratuity, unless for
some of its officers, agents, or employees. The very fact of undertaking the
duty by the servants of the company,
without any additional compensation,
would seem to indicate very clearly that
they understood the service was compensated by the fare paid by the passenger.
How far the servants and employees of a
railway company could fairly be regarded
as acting within the scope of their employment in making such an extraordinary contract, seems to us very questionable. Unless the company had been
in fault in regard to the transportation,
so that it had become their duty to see it
carried, and their servants were therefore strictly in the line of their duty in
forwarding it, in which case they would
unquestionably have the power to bind
the company in selecting the mode of
conveyance; unless this or- some, exceptional case were preseited it seems
to us, as we said, very questionable how.
far the servants of a railway company
could be said to act within the scope of
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their authority in forwarding baggage
by passenger train without the owner
going at the same time. It is certainly
well' understood by all persons at all
conversant with the subject (and all who
deal with servants are bound to learn the
general course of the business), that this
is not the common course of forwarding
baggage ; and that being so, any one desiring to have his baggage forwarded in
that mode must be assumed to understand that this is not within the ordinary scope of the servants' employment,
and by consequence, that they have no
authority to bind the company by any
such undertaking.
But if the general superintendent of
the railway should direct the servants
of the company, in a particular instance, to forward baggage in this mode,

and to give a check accordingly, it does
not seem to us that this ought to be regarded as a gratuitous undertaking, and
so not binding the company as common
carriers. We should certainly regard
them, in that precise case, as common
carriers for hire, although no separate
price was paid for the baggage, but only
the ordinary fare for the passenger and
his baggage. It seems to us more natural to treat the contract of the company
as only extending to the waiver of their
right to have the baggage go in the same
train with the passenger, than to the
waiver of all compensation for the transportation, that being at variance with
the entire scope of their creation and action; the other being only a modification in a very slight but not altogether
I. F. R.
unimportant particular.

Stupreme Court of Missouri.
GILES F. FILLEY, RESPONDENT, V. A. D. FASSETT

ET AL., APPELLANTS.

The complainant having first appropriated and applied the name of' " Charter
Oak" to a certain pattern of stoves manufactured and sold by him, will be protected by injunction in the exclusive use of the name as a trade-mark.
Any contrivance, design, device, name, or symbol, which points out the true
source and origin of the goods to which it is applied, or which designates the
dealer's place of business, may be employed as a trade-mark, and the right to its
exclusive use will be protected by the courts.
The appropriation of any prominent, essential, or vital feature of a trade-mark
by another, is an infringement. If the trade-mark is simulated in such manner
as probably to deceive customers, the piracy may be checked by injunction.
The statute of Missouri providing for the filing of a description of any trademark sought to be used, was not designed to abridge or weaken the right to any
trade-mark which may be acquired in the usual way. It does not authorize the
appropriation by one party of a trade-mark the title and ownership of which
belongs to another.
APPEAL from St. Louis Circuit Court.
In 1851 the plaintiff employed N. S. Vedder, stove-pattern
maker of Troy, N. Y., to design and construct' for him a set or
series of cooking-stove patterns. The patterns were made as
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ordered, and in a form which resulted in the production of a
cooking-stove of a new and improved interior arrangement and
construction, for which Vedder obtained letters patent, which he
assigned to the plaintiff. The plaintiff originated and applied to
the stove the name "Charter Oak," which was so formed upon
the patterns as to produce the name upon the manufactured
article, in combination with a sprig of oak leaves. This name
and device was employed to distinguish and designate cookingstoves of the plaintiff's manufacture. The manufacture and sale
commenced the following year, and has been followed up continuously ever since.
The testimony showed that stoves are usually known in the
trade by their distinctive names, such as "lExcelsior," "1Climax,"
"Empire," "Charter Oak," &c. ; and that they are advertised
and bought and sold by such names and designations; that when
a stove is favorably received and acquires popularity in the market, the peculiar name by which it is known becomes a matter of
importance to the manufacturer, and of great value to him in the
prosecution of his business.
The answer denied that the plaintiff first appropriated and used
that name in such connection, as indicating the source and origin
of the article to which it was applied; and denied that his use
of it had been either exclusive or uninterruptedly continuous;
and averred that the contrary of all this is true.
. L. B. Moss, for appellants.
Samuel S. Boyd, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CURRIER, J.-Upon the issues a large mass of testimony was
taken, from which the following facts are deduced:1. That the plaintiff's appropriation of the name "1Charter
Oak," as already detailed, was prior in point of time to any similar use of that name by any other parties. The testimony is
clear and entirely satisfactory on this point.
2. That notwithstanding such appropriation by the plaintiff,
different manufacturers in Cincinnati, and in that region, at
different times subsequently to 1852, applied the same name to
cooking-stoves of their manufacture, but without the consent of
the plaintiff in any instance, and without his knowledge, except
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in two instances. The first of these two occurred in 1854, and was
at once checked by the plaintiff, and abandoned by the Cincinnati
manufacturer on being apprised of the plaintiff's rights. The other
is that of the manufacture of stoves, the sale of which, with the
plaintiff's alleged trade-mark upon them, is sought to be enjoined
by this suit; and the suit was commenced immediately after the
facts came to the knowledge of the plaintiff.
3.That J. S. & M. Peckham, of Utica, Oneida county, N. Y.,
manufactured in Utica a "Charter Oak" cooking-stove, from
1852 to 1857, and then abandoned it, and never after resumed
the manufacture of that particular stove. The Peckhams purchased their patterns for this stove of said N. S. Vedder, Filley
consenting to the sale on condition certain alterations were first
made in the patterns. This transaction does not appear to have
included specifically the right to use the plaintiff's trade-mark,
nor does it appear that Filley was ever made aware that the purchasers in fact used it. The design of the stove was patented,
and the transaction with the Peckhams involved the granting to
them the right to manufacture in Oneida county its patented
features. That, with the right to sell in a defined territory,
would seem to have constituted the inducement to the purchase
of these patterns rather than others. The particular name which
the plaintiff had originated for the stove which he proposed to
make does not appear to have been mentioned in -the negotiations
with the Peckhams, or to have been in the minds of the parties.
It ought not therefore to be inferred from the mere permission
granted to Vedder to sell the mqdified patterns that the plaintiff
licensed or sold out the use of his trade-mark, particularly in a
contest with third parties, the Peckhams themselves disavowing
al right, claim, or interest in the trade-mark, either as originators
or purchasers.
4. That the plaintiff's use of the trade-mark claimed by him
has.been continuous and uninterrupted since the first adoption by
him to the present time.
The fact that parties in Cincinnati or elsewhere manufactured
"Charter Oak" stoves and sent them into the market to compete
with the plaintiff's manufactures, in no, way aids the defence,
unless it appears that the plaintiff assented to or acquiesced in
such infringements upon his rights; and, as already indicated,
there is nothing in the case to establish a dedication or abandon-
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ment to the public on the part of the plaintiff of his supposed
rights of property in the alleged trade-mark. There is no testimony having that tendency, except the transaction with the Peckhams, and that is insufficient. In Gillott v. Esterbrook, 47 Barb.
455, it appeared that an imitation of the plaintiffs' mark had been
in use for many years, and that for twenty years he had issued
printed "cautions" to the public on the subject, implying knowledge on his part of such use, but that was held no acquiescence,
although the plaintiffs had neglected to institute prosecutions.
The depredations of others on plaintiff's rights furnish no
excuse to the defendants for similar acts on their part. It is
rather an aggravation to the plaintiff that others have also injured
him. And courts have not shown any disposition to encourage
that line of defence. WOODBURY, J., in Taylor v. Carpenter,2
Wood. & Minot 8, held this language: "There is something
abhorrent in allowing such a defence to a wrong which consists
in counterfeiting others' marks and stamps, defrauding others of
what had been gained by their industry and skill, and robbing
them of the fruit of their good name, merely because they have
shown forbearance and kindness." See observations of STOR , J.,
same case, 3 Story's R. 464.
After this suit was commenced, Rosenbaum & Co., who seem
to be the real parties defending against the action, made an
attempt to appropriate the disputed trade-mark to their own use,
in due form of law, by filing in the office of the recorder of deeds
in the county of St. Loiuis a written claim thereto, under the Act
of March 1866, Gen. Stat. 912. A certified copy of the paper
so filed, declaring" that said Rosenbaum & Co. had adopted
"Charter Oak" as their trade-mark for stoves manufactured by
them was given in evidence, and relied upon as showing their title
to the trade-mark as against Filley, who had never filed any such
document. If this proceeding can be made available for the purpose intended, it may be regarded as an entirely new and improved method of disposing of.trade-mark cases, and of appropriating the property of others, the subject of such suits, without
risk or inconvenience, and at very slight cost.
A glance at the statute, however, shows that it wds intended
for no such purpose. It was not designed in the slightest particular to weaken or abridge any existing rights, or any future
right to a trade-mark which might be acquired in the usual way,
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or to legalize in any form or measure piracy in trade-marks.
Property in a trade-mark is acquired at common law only by
appropriation and use, and then only of such names, words, and
devices as may be held to be adapted to point out the true source
and origin of the goods to which such marks are applied. The
statute widens the range of selection, and authorizes the mechanic
or manufacturer to adopt any name or device he pleases, and to
foreclose any controversy on the subject by writing out and filing
with the recorder, as the law provides, an accurate description of
the name, device, &c., that may have been chosen. But such
paper is to be filed in the county where the goods, &c., are to be
manufactured or prepared. It is not perceived how this can be
made to apply to Rosenbaiim & Co.'s stoves, which are manufactured in another state. The statute has no application to the facts
of the present litigation. Nor will any fair construction of it
warrant the appropriation by one party of an existing trademark, the title and ownership of which is in another party.
But it is objected that the words " Charter Oak," with the
accompanying device, lack the requisite ingredients or characteristics of a trade-mark, and therefore it is insisted that the plaintiff could acquire no exclusive right to their use for that purpose.
The books are full of authority establishing the proposition
that any contrivance, design, device, name, symbol, or other thing,
may be employed as a trade-mark which is adapted to accomplish
the object proposed by it; that is, to point out the true source
and origin of the goods to which said mark is applied; or evento point out and designate a dealer's place of business, distinguishing it from the business locality of other dealers. The mark,
however, must possess the requisite characteristics, pointing out
the source and origin of the goods, and not be merely descriptive
of the style, quality, or character of the goods themselves. Thus
it has repeatedly been held that where the name or device employed had, from use or other cause, come tb be descriptive of the
goods manufactured or sold, their quality and use, such name or
device was ineffectual and could not be upheld as a trade-mark.
It was so as to the letters "A. C. A.," in the leading and famous
case of The Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. S.
C. R. 599, as also in Stokes v. Landgraff, 1.7 Barb. 608, and in
various other cases cited by the defendants. But these authorities
have no application to the mark claimed by the plaintiff. For the
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name "Charter Oak,"'with the combined device, in no possible
view or application of them, are either descriptions or suggestive
of the style, character, or qualities of a cast-iron cooking-stove.
In their natural significancy, import, or symbolism, or in the use
made of them prior to the plaintiff's appropriation of them as a.
trade-mark, they were as far removed as can well be imagined
from ccnve-ing any such application or meaning. And that constitutes one of their virtues as a trade-mark: Petridge v. Herchant, 4 Abb. Prac. R. 158; 6 Beav. 66; 4 McLean 516.
The general rule respecting the characteristics of trade-marks
.hasalready been given. The following names and designations,
among many others, have been held to come within that rule. As
pointing to a hotel, "Irving House," (8 Sand. S. C. 726); "Revere House," (7 Cush. 322). As pointing to a manufacturer or
dealer, "Cocoaine," (9 Bosw. 192); "Howe," (50 Barb. 236);
"Akron," the name of a town, (19 Barb. 599); "London Conveyance Company," (2 Keene 220); "803," the designation of a
particular pen, (47 Barb. 471); "Bell's Life," the name of a
newspaper, (22 Law Rep. 428) ; "Roger Williams Long Cloth,"
(6 R. I. 434) ; "Day & Martin," (7 Beavan 89).
The name and device selected by the plaintiff were adopted to
point out the true source and origin of the stoves to which he
applied them, and were therefore possessed of the requisite characteristics of a trade-mark. By the adoption and use of that
mark he acquired a property interest therein which the courts will
protect. Have the defendants invaded the rights of the plaintiff
in this behalf?
The defendants accumulated in the St. Louis market a quantity of the Rosenbaum & Co. stoves, with the name "Charter
Oak" upon them, which they held for sale as " Charter Oak"
stoves. They were aware of the plaintiff's proprietorship of the
"Charter Oak" trade-mark, and were proceeding to sell in defiance of plaintiff's rights.
In this condition of things the present suit was instituted and
an injunction granted restraining the defendants from the proposed sale. The only question raised on this branch of the case
is, whether the use of the name "Charter Oak," separated from.
the other parts of the plaintiff's mark, amounted to an infringement of his rights, assuming his ownership of the name as a
trade-mark in combination with the device of oak leaves.
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On this point there can be no reasonable doubt. The plaintiff's
stoves were not conspicuously known by the particular device
which surrounded the name upon them, but by the name itself.
That was the conspicuous element in the mark. By that name
the stove was bought and sold, and known in the Western and
Southern markets. It was the prominent essential and vital feature of the plaintiff's trade-mark. That name the defendants and
their principals. appropriated bodily, and applied it to their stoves,
and sought to acquire the sole and exclusive use of it by filing
their claim in the recorder's office under the statute. That shows
their appreciation of the value of the name, and of their purpose
not only to use it themselves, but to exclude the originator of it from
its use. Granting Filley's exclusive right, there can be no doubt
that the things done. and purposed by the defendants were of injurious tendency, and that the name "Charter Oak," as employed
by them, was eminently calculated to mislead buyers as to the
true source and origin of the stove to which the defendants
applied that name. If the name as used by them was calculated
to mislead, the intention to deceive is to be inferred therefrom:
Jetridge v. ljlerchant, 4 Abb. Pr. R. 159; 4 Mann. & Gr. 385.
The imitation of an original trade-mark need not be exact or
perfect. It may be limited and partial; nor is it requisite that
the whole should be pirated. Nor is it necessary to show that
any one has, in fact, been deceived; or that the party complained
of made the goods: 2 Sand. S. C. 607; 25 Barb. 79; 23 Eng.
L. & E. 53-4; 2 Sand. Ch. 597. Nor is it necessary to prove
intentional fraud. "If the court sees that complainant's trademarks are simulated in such a manner as probably to deceive
customers or patrons of his trade or business, the piracy should
be checked at once by injunction :" 4 McLean 519; 2 Barb. Ch.
:10.
The result is, that the judgment of the Circuit- Court must be
affirmed.
The other judges concur.
The right of a party to protection in paratively recent origin in its fulness
the use of his trade-mark, meaning and perfection, was foreshadowed as
. thereby any "names, signs, marks, early as the time of the Year Books, in
brands, labels, words, or devicds of any the case of Sothern ,. How, 2 Croke 468.
kind, which can be advantageously used
Although the recognition of this right
to designate his goods," though of corn- by courts of equity, and its consequent
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protection by injunction, was at a much
later period, it is now so firmly established by the highest authority as a proper subject for the exercise of the restraining control of that court, whenever
violated, that it is no longer an open
question: Amosk-eag Manufacturing Co.
v. Spear, 2 Sandf. S. C. 606.
A trade-mark may, in its elementary
signification, be applicable to a great
variety of forms, marks, or symbols
designating the origin or ownership of
the thing to which it is applied.
For instance, the title "Irving House"
having been used by a person for three
years only, as a name of his hotel, an
injunction was granted against a party
setting up a hotel and calling it by the
same name: Howard v. Henriques, 3
Sandf. S. C. 726.
The same principle was held in respect to the name "1Revere House" when
applied to coaches: Marsh v. Billings,
7 Cush. 322.
"Cocoine," as a name of hair oil,
held to be an infringement'on "Cocoaine ;" and this, too, though the ingredients of the oil were open to the use
of all: Burnett r. Phalon, 9 Bosw. 192.
Held by the court that A. B. Howe had
such an exclusive right to the use of the
word "Howe" as a trade-mark, placed
by him upon a sewing maehine sold by
him under a license from E. Howe, Jr.,
the patentee, that E. Howe, Jr., could be
restrained from using it as such: Howe
v. Howe Machine Co., 50 Barb. 236.
Parties making lime at the town of
Akron were held entitled to use the
word "Akron" as a trade-mark, and
an injunction was granted against the
defendants who marked their lime with
this word: Newman v. Alvord, 49 Barb.
588.
The number "303" was held to be a
proper subject for a trade-mark of pens,
and its use was restrained by injunction:
Gillott v. Rsterbrook, 47 Barb. 455.
The term "London Conveyance

Co.," as the name of an omnibus company, was upheld as a trade-mark in
Knott v. Morgan, 2 Keene 220.
"Sykes' Patent" as a trade-mark for
shot-bolts was sustained by injunction
against a party of the same name, and
that, too, though the party bad a perfect
right to make the identical article, there
being in fact no patent: SAykes v. Sykes,
3 Barn. & Cress. 543.
"Penny Bell's Life," the name of a
newspaper, was restrained as an infringement of "Bell's Life," in Clement v.
Maddick, 22 Law Rep. 428.
"H. H. 6," as a trade-mark of
ploughis, was upheld: eemson v. Bental,
3 Law Jour. N. S. 161.
" Seixo," as a brand for wine, was
sustained: Seixo v. Provezende, I Chan.
App. Cas. 184.
"Roger Williams Long Cloth" was
upheld, and those using "+ Roger Williams" as a designation of cotton cloth
were restrained: Barrows v. Knight,
6 R. L 434.
"Anatolia," as a brand for liquorice, was sustained in McAndrews v. Bassett, 10 Jurist N. S. 550, though it was
argued that the word being common to
all there could be no property in it;
Lord WESTnunr saying: "property in
a word for all purposes cannot exist, but
property in a word as applied by way of
stamp upon a stick of liquorice does
exist the moment the liquorice gets into
the market so stamped."
In Pidding v. Howe, 8 Simons 477,
the name used was "Howqua Mixture ;"
and the court said: "The defendant,
finding that the plaintiff's mixture was
in considerable demand, had recently
begun to sell a mixture of his own under the-same designation. ,I apprehend
that primd facie the defendant was not
at liberty to do that."
In Goutt v. Aleplogl , 6 Beavan 69,
the court restrained the defendant from
using the Tuikish word "Pessendede,"
meaning "1warranted or approved," on
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watches made by him, the plaintiff having long used such word as a mark for
his watches.
In Croft v. Day, 7 Beavan 89, "Day
& Martin," as a trade-mark for blacking, was sustained against a firm, the
real name of which was Day & Martin.
"Bismarck" as name of paper collars,
was upheld in Aesserole v. Tynberg, 4
Abb. Pr. N. S. 414, the court remarking: "There is no reason for making
any distinction between a common word
or term used for an original purpose,
which has accomplished its object, and a
new design adopted by a manufacturer."
In Farinav. Silrerlock, 39 Eng. Law
& Eq. 517, an injunction was granted
against the engraver who made simulated labels to sell to third parties.
There seems to be no more restriction
against the choice o' a name for a trademark than the choice of a symbol. It is
sufficient that the name in its application to the goods be so far original and
peculiar as to be capable of distingaish.
ing when known in the market one
manufacturer's goods from thoec of another: Ainsworth v. WValmsley, 1 rAw
Rep. Eq. Cos. 252; Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. S. C.
605 ; Newman v. Alvord, 49 Barb. 592;
Williams v. Johnson, 2 Bosw. 1.
A party being fully possessed of
this right of property in his trademark, will not be held to have waived
such right by reason of his neglect to
restrain others from its use. "It is no
excuse that others have used or are using
such trade-mark :" Taylorv. Carpenter,
3 -Story 462 ; Coates v. Holbrook, 2
Sandf. Ch. 596; Taylor v. Carpenter,
2 Wood. & Min. 8.
Where the use by others is with the
knowledge of the original owner of the
mark, his consent, if implied at all in
the knowledge of such use, can be revoked at any time: Gillott v. Esterbrook, 47 Barb. 471.
In relation to what constitutes an in-

fringement, it is settled that "The
whole trade-mark need not be pirated :"
Ibid. 469.
"An injunction ought to issue when
ever the design, either apparent or
proved, is to impose on the public, and
the imitation is such that the success of
the design is a probable or possible consequence: Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.
v. Spear, 2 Sandf. S. C. 607.
"If the wholesale buyer, who is most
conversant with the marks, is not misled,
but the small retailer or the consumer
is, the right of action must exist:"
Clark-v. Clark, 25 Barb. 79.
"It is not necessary that any proof
should be made of any one having been
deceived, but the court will examine the
two things, and see if they are not cal-,
culated to deceive." When there is a
strong resdmblance the court will presume it is not fortuitous, but that it
was intentional with a view to mislead
purchasers: Eddleston.v. Vick, 23 Eng."
Law & Eq.5-4.
-Nor is it necessary that the one in-*
fringing upon the trade'xnark should
be shown to offer the articles as those
of the plaintiff's *manufacture,for even
where the contrary appeared, an injunction was ordered in the case of Sykes v.
Sykes, 3 Barn. & Cress. 543.
And even where the defendant expressly informed the purchaser that the
trade-mark placed on the goods was an
imitation of the plaintiff's mark, an injunction was granted, on the ground
that succeeding dealers might not make
a similar disclosure : Coates v. Holbrook,
3 Sandf. Ch. 586.
It is not necessary that the defendants
should be the manufacturers of the
goods. They can be enjoined although
only commission merchants, selling in
the strict line of their business : Ibid.
It is not necessary to prove intentional
fraud on the part of defendant to warrant equitable relief. It is the probability of deception which justifies the
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remedy by injunction: Cofi'een v. Brunton, 4 McLean 519; Dale v. SSmiatson,
12 Abb. Pr. 238.
In the collection of the foregoing

cases upon the law of trade-marks, we
acknowledge our indebtedness to the
able brief of S. S. Boyd, counsel in the
case to which this note is appended.
A. M.

Supreme Gouri of Pennsylvania.
HAMMETT v. THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA.
'It is settled in Pennsylvania that the legislature may confer upon municipal corporations the power to assess the cost of local improvements upon the property
benefited.
But such local assessments call only be imposed to pay for local improvements,
clearly conferring special benefits on the properties assessed, and to the extent of
those benefits. They cannot be imposed when the improvement is either expressed
or appears to be for geneal public benefit.
The paving of a street, changing a road into a street, and bringing the land
fronting on it into the market as building lots, is a local improvement, with
special benefits to the land fronting on it, and the cost of such paving may be
assessed on the property benefited.
But when a street is once opened and paved, and has thus become a part of the
public highways of the city, the repaving of it, either with a new and different
pavement, or by repairing the old one, is a part of the general duty of the corporation, and cannot be paid for by assessments on the adjoining properties.

WrlT of error to the District Court of the city of Philadelphia.

The action was on a municipal claim filed in the following form.
The CiTy or PHILADELPHIA to the use I
Of CHARLES E. JtuENIs and JONATHAN
TAYLOR,

In the District Court of the

City and County of Philadel-

p.hia, of ffath Term 1868.
BARNABAS HAMXRTT, owner or reputed
NUBiR 31.
owner.
The City of Philadelphia,'to the use of Charles E. Jenkins and Jonathn
Taylor, files this claim against Barnabas Hammett, owner or reputed owner,
of all that certaii lot or piece of ground, with the buildings and improvements thereon erected, situate at the south-west corner of Broad and Poplar
streets, for 1007M.f square yards of Nicolson pavement, done and laid in
front of the premises above described, in Broad street, on the 27th day of
November 1867, pursuant to the authority of "An Act supplementary to
an Act to incorporate the City of Philadelphia, authorizing the improvement of Broad street in said City,'" approved March 23d 1866, and of "An
Ordinance authorizing tlxe paving of a portion of Broad street with Nicolson Pavement," approved July 5th 1867, at the rate of four dollars per
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square yard, or the sum of $4029.04, and for five per cent. on said sum, or
the sum of $201.45, as imposed by "A further Supplement to an Act
consolidating the City of Philadelphia, et cetera, regulating the filing and
collection of Municipal Claims," approved March 23d 1866 ; for which sum
of $4230.49, with interest thereon, a lien is claimed against the above described premises, pursuant to divers statutes enacted and provided.
JAmEs LYND, Solicitor of the City of Philadelphia.
DAvID W. SELLERS, Attorney for Jenlins and Taylor.

March 26th 1868.
The Act of March 23d 1866, Pamph. L. 299, in sect. 1 thus
enacted:.That the city of Philadelphia be and it is hereby authorized and empowered and required to occupy Broad street, in the city of Philadelphia,
for its entire length, as the same is now opened or may hereafter be opened,
and from curb to curb thereof, except as hereinafter provided, for the uses
and purposes of a public drive, carriageway, street, or avenue, and to improve the said street,-or portions thereof, from time to time, and in whole
or in part, with such mode of pavement, paving, macadamizing, gravelling,
or other roadway, as may, in the judgment. of the Select and Common
Councils of said city, be best adapted to and for the uses and purposes aforesaid ; and for that purpose the said Councils shall have, and are hereby
authorized to enact such ordinances or resolutions, with such conditions or
stipulations as may require the cost of said improvements to be paid for by
the owners of property abutting upon said street."
Under the authority of this act the city of Philadelphia contracted with the licensees of the patentee of the. Nicolson pavement to pave a portion of Broad street with that pavement, the
ost thereof to be paid by the owners. The licensees were
authorized to use the name of the city to recover the cost.
A scire facias was issued upon the above claim, and the owner
of the ground filed an affidavit of defence as follows:"Barnabas Hammett, defendant above named, being duly
sworn, deposes and says: That there is a defence to the plaintiff's
claim, -as follows:
. ".Broad street, at the part described in the claim,
in front of
the premises owned by this deponent, was, at the time of making
the contract for paving the same by Jenkins & Taylor,'and of
doing the work thereunder for which the claim is filed, well
paved with cobble stones in the style universally adopted for years
past in this city for the best paved avenues, and" such pavement
was then in good order and condition, with every probability of it
so continuing: it had been laid by the city and her authorized
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agents, of their own option, at thq time they saw fit, and in such
mode and with such material as they chose to select, irrespective

of any wish of the then owner of the premises, and the entire
expenses thereof both of the materials for the pavement and
the laying of the same, were paid by the then owner of the
said real estate to the city and her agents at their request, and in
obedience to the laws authorizing the pavement of the streets.
Afterwards and while (as above stated) the pavement laid by the
city at the expense of the owner of the premises was in good
order, the city of Philadelphia entered into a contract with said
Jenkins & Taylor, under which and not otherwise the plaintiffs
did the work for the price of which the said claim is filed and this
suit is brought.
"Deponent is advised that the said Act of Assembly is unconstitutional and therefore void, in this: that it delegates to the
councils of the city power to impose upon certain persons owners
of certain properties facing a public avenue, the entire burden of
a general unrestricted work to be undertaken, in the words of the
preamble, ' for the uses and purposes of the public and the benefits and advantages which will enure to them,' when those properties had already been subjected to the contribution for paving
usual to all other city pioperties."
The District Court, upon rule, entered judgment for want of a
sufficient affidavit of defence, and to that judgment this writ of
error was taken.
'William A. Porter and Constant -uillou,Esqs., for plaintiff in
error, contended that no case in Pennsylvania had recognised any
power in the legislature to re-pave at the expense of the ground
which had already borne the expense of paving.
William .cMichael and -David W. Sellers, Esqs., for defendants in error, contended thft acts imposing the cost of opening
and paving highways, on owners of ground fronting thereon, are
within the power of the legislature; and cited most of the cases
quoted in the opinion of the court, and the dissenting opinion of
READ, J.

They further contended that if there was no constitutional
limit on the power, the whole subject-matter was one of public
policy-for the legislature, and not for the courts; and that if the
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power was conceded, the reason for its exercise was not reviewable
anywhere.
That in a former case this court had declined to
allow a similar averment that municipal work was wholly for public uses to defeat the charge against the individual: City v. Tryon,
11 Casey 401.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SIHARSWOOD, J.-It may be considered as a point fully settled
and at rest in this state, that the legislature have the constitutional
right to confer upon municipal corporations the power of assessing
the cost of local improvements upon the properties benefited.
It is a species of taxation; not the taking of private property by
virtue of eminent domain. It was decided in fcJJeasters v. The
Commonwealth, 3 Watts 292, that in the opening of streets in a
town or city, the damage occasioned to some of the lots might be
apportioned and assessed upon others in the neighborhood improved
in value thereby. It is there assumed, as a well-settled principle,
employing the words of Chancellor WALWORTH in Livingston v.
New York, 8 Wend. 85, that when any particular county, district,
or neighborhood is exclusively benefited by a public improvement,
the inhabitants of that district may be taxed for the whole expense
of the improvement and in proportion to the supposed benefit
received by each. The conclusion seemed logically to follow;
for, if a county, district, or town can be assessed for a public
improvement on the ground that they are particularly benefited,
there can be no constitutional reason to exempt an individual from
assessment on the same principle. It becomes a mere question ofexpediency, of which the legislature are the competent and exclusive judges, and not of right. This doctrine is again asserted in
Fenlon'8 Petition, 7 Barr 173; and in the subsequent case of the
Extension of HTancock Street, 6 Harris 26, the constitutionality
of such an exercise of the taxing power was declared to be no
longer an open question.
On the same principle the validity of municipal claims assessing
on the lots fronting upon streets their due share of the. cost of
grading, curbing, paving, building sewers and culverts, and laying
water-pipes, in proportion to their respective fronts, has been
repeatedly recognised, and the liens for such assessments enforced:
Pennock v. Hoover, 5 Rawle 291; The Northern Liberties v. St.
John's Church, 1 Harris 104 ; The City v. Wistar, 11 Casey 427 ;
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The Commonwealth v. Woods, 8 Wright 113; Magee v. The Commonwealth, 10 Id. 358; Wray v. The Mayor, ft., of -Pittsburgh,
Id. 265.
These cases all fall strictly within the rule as originally enunciated-local taxation for local purposes-or, ds it has been elsewhere expressed, taxation on the benefits conferred, and not
beyond the extent of those benefits. There is, indeed, no clause
in the Constitution of Pennsylvania which restricts the power of
taxation in the legislature as is to be found in the constitutions of
many of our sister states. Yet it must be confessed that there
are necessary limits to it in the very nature of the subject. It is
very clear that the taxing power cannot be used in violation of
provisions.in the Bill of Rights, everything in which is " excepted
out of the general powers of government, and shall for ever
remain inviolate." There is no case to be found in this state, nor,
as I believe, after a very thorough research, in any other-with
limitations in the constitution or without them-in which it has
been held that a legislature, by virtue merely of its general powers,
can levy, or authorize a municipality to levy, a local tax for general purposes. I shall have a word to say presently of two or
-three of our cases which are supposed to countenance such an
idea. It may be shown logically, and that without difficulty, that
such a doctrine lands us in this absurd proposition: That the
whole expenses of government, general and local, may be laid
upon the shoulders of one man, if one could be found able to bear
such a burden.. A conclusion so monstrous shows that the premises must be wrong. Such a measure would not be taxation, but
confiscation. That can only be the consequence of attainder for
crime, and not even then to its full extent, for there can be no forfeiture of estate to the Commonwealth except during the life of
the offender. It is well remarked by Chief Justice ROBERTSON,
of Kentucky, under a constitution without restraint on the legislative power of taxation: "A m exact equalization of the burden
of taxation is unattainable and Utopian. But, still, there are
well-defined .limits within which the practical equality of the constitution may be preserved, and which, therefore, should be deemed
impassable barriers to legislative power.

*

*

*

*

*

The

legislature, in the plenitude of its taxing power, cannot have constitutional authority to exact from one citizen, or even one iounty,
the entire revenue of the whole Commonwealth. Such an exac-
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tion, by whatever name the legislature might choose to call it,
would not be a tax, but would, undoubtedly, be the taking of
private property for public use, and which could not be done constitutionally without the consent of the owner or owners, and
without retributioi of the value in money :" Lexington v. He Quillan's Heirs, 9 Dana 618. "A legislative act," says Chief Justice
BEASLEY, of New Jersey, "authorizing the building of a public
bridge, and directing the expenses to be assessed on A., B., and
C., such persons not being in any way peculiarly benefited by
such structure, would not be an act of taxation, but a condemnation of so much of the money of the person designated to a public. use:" The !Tidewater Co. v. Carter, 8 C. E. Green 518.
"The whole of a public burden," says Chief Justice BLACK,
"cannot be thrown on a single individual under pretence of taxing him, nor can one county be taxed to pay the debt of another,
nor one portion of -the state to pay the debts of the whole state.
These things are not excepted from the- powers of the legislature,
because they did not pass to the Assembly by the general grant of
legislative power. A prohibition was not necessary. An Act of
Assembly commanding or authorizing them to be done, would not
be a law, but an attempt to pronounce a judicial sentence, order,
or decree :" Sharpless v. The Jfayor of Philadel hia, 9 Harris
168. It is said that the line of distinction between the right of
taxation and the right of eminent domain is clear and well defined.
Taxation exacts money or services from individuals, as and for
their respective shares of contribution to any public burden.
Private property, taken for public use by right of eminent domain,
is taken not as the owner's share* or contribution to a public burthen, but as so much beyond his share: The People ex rel. Griffin
v. Brooklyn, 4 Comst: 419. It has been said by Judge FIELD,
of California, now on the bench of the Supreme Court of the
United States, that "money is not that species of property which
the sovereign authority can authorize to be taken in the exercise
of its right of eminent domain. That right carn be exercised only
with reference to other property than money, for the property
taken is to be the subject of compensation in money itself; and
the general doctrine of the authorities of the present day is, that
the compensation must be made, or a fund provided for it, in
advance:" Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 California 76. I am not
able, and do not feel disposed,-to enter the lists upon such a ques-
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tion, but it does seem to me that there may be occasions in which
money may be taken by the state in the exercise of its transcendental right of eminent domain. Such would be the case of a
pressing and immediate necessity; as in the event of invasion by
a public enemy, or some great calamity, as famine or pestilence,
contributions could be levied on banks, corporations, or individuals. 'The obligation of compensation is not immediate. It is
required only that provision should be made for compensation in
the future. Judge RUGGLES confines the right to exact money
by virtue of the eminent domain, to the case where it is for the
use of the state at large in time of war: The People ex rel.
Griffit v. Brooklyn, 4 Comst. 419. I cannot see that there is
any such necessary limitation. The public necessity which gives
rise to it, prevents its being restrained by any limitations as to
either subject or occasion. In truth it matters not whether an
assessment upon an individual or a class of individuals for a general, and not a mere local purpose, be regarded as an act of confiscation-a judicial sentence or rescript, or a taking of private
property for public use without compensation-in any aspect, it
transcends the power of the legislature, and is void. I regard it
as a forced contribution. If the: sovereign breaks open the strongbox of an individual or corporation and takes out money, or, if
not being-paid on demand, he seizes and sells the lhnds ez-goods
of the subject, it looks to me very much like a direct taking of
private property for public use. It certainly cannet alter the
case to call it taxation. Whenever a local assessment upon an
individual is not grounded upon, and measured by, the extent of
his particular benefit, it is, pro tanto, a taking of his. private property for public use without any provision fr'. compensation.
That clause in the Declaration of Rights is, indeed; the sheet'anchor of private property, the security of which- against tlio
government, as well as all others, is intended in the. tst section'
of the 9th article: "All men have certain inherent and? indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
"andliberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and
reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness." The dollar
which a poor man has earned by the sweat of his brow-the fortune which a rich man has inherited from his ancestors-stand on
the sarfte rock, and are surrounded and protected by the same barrier. Invested for comfort and assurance against want in sickness
VOL. XVIIo-27
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or old age, or cherished as a provision for widow or orphan after
he has gone, it is a right which it is despotism to take from him,
except for the necessary purposes of government by equal and
just taxation. It is none the less so if it be the act of the hydraheaded monster, a numerical majority, or that of a single autocrat.
It is the solemn duty of the judiciary, under our Constitution, to
guard and protect this right of property, as well from indirect
attacks under any specious pretext, as from open and palpable
invasion. "There being," says Chief Justice MARSHALL, of Kentucky, "no express constitutional declaration or prohibition
directly applicable to the powers or subject of taxation, and none
which, in terms, secures equality or uniformity in the distribution
of public burthens, either general or local, there is no clause to
which the citizen can, with certainty, appeal for protection against
an oppressive and ruinous discrimination, under color of the taxing
power, unless it be that which prohibits the taking of private property for public use without compensation.

*

*

*

*

This is

the great conservative principle of the Constitution, by which the
rights of private property are to be preserved from violation under
public authority; and we should feel bound to give it, as has
heretofore been done, a liberal construction for the attainment of
so important and valuable an object:" Cheany v. Houser, 9 B.
Monroe 341.
It may be said that Shdrpless v. The Mayor of Philadelphia,9
larris 147, and _irby v. Shaw, 7 Id. 258, are irreconcilable with
the reasoning employed in this opinion. As to the first of thtese
cases it is now practically unimportant, because it has been in
effect reversed by the 7th section of the 1st amendment of the
Constitution of 1857. It has been seen' that it recognises that
there are limits to the taxing power such as are here contended
for; and the only doubt can be whether the rule was rightly
-applied. As to Kirby v. jShaw, although a case on the very verge
of the principle which is established-local taxation for local purposes-and there are some generalizations in the judgment as
pronounced by Chief Justice GiBsON by far too broad, yet ultimately it is put on the ground of peculiar benefit. "The advantages of a county town," says he, "are too well appreciated not
to make every village use all its exertions to have a court-house
provided for its benefit and convenience. Without a court-house"
to replace the burnt one, Towanda could not have remained the
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seat of justice; and as its inhabitants profited by, not only the
disbursements of the tax among them, but a permanent increase
of their business and an appreciation of their property, they were
morally bound to contribution. It was for the legislature to fix
the proportion, and we have neither a right nor a disposition to
question their justice." Here, too, the only real question would
seem to be as -to the application of the principle. Kirby] v. Bliaw
has been since followed by this court in the case of -the South
Street Bridge, The City of .Philadelphiav. Field et al. (July 2d
1868), a judgment in which the Chief Justice and myself were
unable to concur.
Assessments on property peculiarly benefited by local improvements, and in consideration of such benefit, are constitutionalthus far have the judieial decisions in this and other states gone,
and no further. A few only of the leading cases need be cited.
n the Matter of Canal Street, 11 Wend. 155; Hill v. Higdon, 5
Ohio (N. S.) 243; Stryker v. Kelly, 7 Hill 9, 23; S. c., 2 Denio
323; Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504; Lowell v. Hfeadley, 8
Metcalf 180; Garrett v. City of St. Louis, 55 Missouri 505;
Anderson v. Kern, Draining, 14 Indiana 199; Sanborn v. 'ice
County, 9 Minn. 273; Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wise. 242;
Creigitonv. Mancon, 27 Cal. 613; Tide Water Co. v. Coster, 8
C. E. Green 54, 518. Undoubtedly, the power of taxation is not
to be rigidly scanned. Every presumption is to be made in its,
favor. If the case is within the principle, the proportion of contribution and other details are within the discretion of the taxing
power. We may say -with Judge PEcK of Ohio: "It is quite
true that the right to impose such special taxes is based upon a
presumed equivalent, but it by no means follows that there must
be in fact such full equivalent in every instance, or that its absence
will render the assessment invalid. -The rule of apportionmerit,
whether by the front foot or a percentage upon the assessed valuation, must be uniform, affecting all the owners and all the property
abutting on the street alike :" Northern Indiana Railroad Co. v.
Connelly, 10 Ohio (N. S.) 159. Or, as in our own case of Commonwealth v. Woods, 8 Wright 113, where it was held, in an
instance unquestionably within the general principle, that the
assessment when made in pursuance of law is final and conclusive, and cannot again be reviewed by any other tribunal. On
the examination of the cases I have found two in which it was
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attempted, though fortunately without success, to make the owners
personally liable for assessments beyond the value of their lots,
cases which show how dangerous and liable to abuse is this power
of special taxation with all the guards which can be thrown
around it. In the Matter of Cdnal Street, 11 Wend. 155, the
court say: 1 In this case it is assumed and not contradicted that
many individuals will be ruined if compelled to pay the assessments for which they are liable." In 6-eighton v. Manson, 27
California 613, the lot in question, before the grading of the
street, for which the assessment was claimed, was appraised for
revenue purposes at $1400. It was rendered worthless by the
grading; yet the attempt was made to make the owners personally
liable for its assessment, which was $1989.54.
It remains to apply these principles to the case presented to us
upon this record. The original paving of a street brings the property bounding upon it into the market as building lots. Before
that, it is a road, not a street. It is, therefore, a local improvement, with benefits almost exclusively peculiar to the adjoining
properties. Such a case is clearly within the principle of assessing the cost on the lots lying upon it. Perhaps no fairer rule can
be adopted than the proportion of feet front, although there must
be some inequalities if the lots differ in situation and depth.
Appraising their market values, and fixing the proportion accord•ing to these, is a plan open to favoritism or corru'ption, and other
objections. No system of taxation which the wit of man ever
devised has been found perfectly equal. But when a street is
once opened and paved, thus assimilated with the rest of the city
and made a part of it, all the particular benefits to the locality
derived from the improvements have been received and enjoyed.
Repairing streets is as much a part of the ordinary duties of the
municipality-for the general good-as cleaning, watching, and
lighting. It would lead to monstrous injustice and inequality
sh6uld such general expenses be provided 'for by local assessments.
This case indeed is still clearer than that which I have put of a
simple repairing. Broad street, in front of the lot of the plaintiff in error, was paved only a few years ago in the ordinary way
in which all the other streets of the city have .been paved-with
cobble-stones-and whatever .advantage there was in his owning'
property on so wide and handsome a street was paid for by him in
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the increased cost assessed upon him for the paving. Without
any pretence that it has been worn out and required to be replaced
by another, it was torn up, and a new and very expensive wooden
pavement substituted. The plaintiff in error did not remain
silent. He protested and remonstrated, and filed a bill in equity
to restrain the Work before it began. The city and their contractors can plead no equity against him. It is said that it was.
all for his interest. But whether he was mistaken or not as to his
own interest, he was the judge of that, not this court. The case
is not to be decided upon any particular results in this instance,
but on general principles which can work with safety and advantags to the public in all other cases. Mr. Hammett may have
been specially benefited; though we have no evidence of that on
this recprd, and we have no right to consider evidence derived
from any other source, but the next experiment may be unsuccessful and ruinous. It was well said by the court in The People ez
rel. Post v. Brooklyn, 6 Barb. 209: "If it be true that certain
individuals are so greatly benefited, they will be quite as apt to
discover where their interests lie as the Common Council; and if
their lands are to be so much enhanced in value, they will, by
their contributions, enable the authorities to perform the work at
a very trifling expense to the city at large." The object of this
improvement is not to -bring or keep Broad street as all the other
streets within the built-up portions of the city are kept, for the
advantage and comfort of those who live upon it, and for ordinary
business and travel, but to make a great public drive-a pleasureground-along which elegant equipages may disport of an afternoon. We need look no further than the preamble of the act
authorizing the improvement of Broad street, passed March 28d
1866, Pamph. L. 299, for evidence that it is for the general public good, not for mere peculiar local benefit. It states it to be
"for the uses and purposes of the public, and the benefits and
advantages which will enure to them by making and for ever maintaining Broad street, in the city of Philadelphia, for its entire
length as the same is now opened, or may hereafter be opened, the
* principal avenue of the said city." Thus we have special taxation authorized for an object, avowed on the face of the act to be
general and not local, which relieves the case of all diificulty as to
the fact. We have only to advance the project a few steps further to see how preposterous is the idea of paying for such an
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improvement by assessments. In the natural course of things, we
may expect that it will be proposed to adorn this principal avenue
with monuments, statuary, and fountains. Will their cost be provided for in the same way? How much does this plan differ from
a proposition to erect new public buildings on Independence
Square, and assess the cost on the lots situated on the neighboring
streets ? On the same principle, lots on the public squares could
be assessed to pay for any new project to beautify and adorn
them, no matter how great tie expense. It might be argued with
equal plausibility that their value was increased by the improvement. We must say at some time to this tide of special taxation,
Thus far shalt thou go, and no further. To our own decisions, as
far as they have gone, we mean to adhere, but we are now asked
to take a step much in advance of them. This we would not be
justified, by the principles of the Constitution, in doing.
Local assessments can only be constitutional when imposed to
pay for local improvements, clearly conferring special benefits on
the properties assessed, and to the extent of those benefits.
They cannot be so imposed when the improvement is either expressed or appears to be for general public benefit.
There have been several other points raised and discussed on
this record, but we are not obliged to consider them ; and as the
conclusion at which we have arrived that the Act of Assembly of
March 23d 1866, so-far as it authorizes the councils of the city
of Philadelphia "to enact such ordinances or resolutions with such
conditions or stipulations as may require the cost of said improvements to be paid for by the owners of property abutting on said
street," is unconstitutional and void, disposes of the whole case,
it is unnecessary to discuss any other.
Judgment reversed.
READ, J., dissented.'
'-We regret that its length prevents our printing the. elaborate and able dissenting opinion of READ, J., containing a very full and learned review of the
subject of legislative power over local assessments both in England and in Pennsylvania as a colony and as a state.

IN RE ALEXANDER.

United States Circuit Court.

-Districtof Virginia.

MATTER OF J. D. ALEXANDER, A BANKRUPT.
The appellate jurisdiction, properly so called, of the Circuit Court in bankruptcy matters is limited to controversies between assignees and the claimants
of adverse interests, and between assignees and creditor-claimants respecting the
allowance of claims.
The supervisory jurisdiction of the Circuit Court includes all decisions of the
District Court, or the district judge at chambers, which cannot be reviewed by
appeal or writ of error under the appellate jurisdicti6n given by the 8th section.
An appeal must be taken in the time and manner prescribed by the act. The
regulations as to appeals are regulations of jurisdiction, and cannot be enlarged
or restricted by the Circuit or District Courts.

THis was a petition by B: C. Bagley and John Alexander for
the revision of*an order of the District Court. It appeared that
among the assets of the bankrupt was a tract of land, encumbered
by a deed of trust, executed by him on the 24th of December
1864, in favor of William D. Miller, to secure the payment of
three bonds, each for $17,000, payable in four, eight, and twelve
years from date respectively; that the petitioner Alexander was
tenant of the tract under the assignees, claiming a term, which
would not expire until January 1st 1870; and that the petitioner
Bagley held a judgment which was a lien on the real estate of the
bankrupt, and was claimed to be the next lien after the deed
of trust.
On the 16th of March 1869, the District Coirt made two
orders, one directing the assignees to sell the land, and the other
directing that Miller might become the purchaser, and that the
assignees should receive the amount of his bid in the trust bonds
at par. The petitioners, as soon as these orders came to their
knowledge, prayed an appeal in the name and with the approval
of the assignees, and immediately notified Miller and the clerk
of the District Court of their appeal.
The time for filing the bond on appeal was extended, by the
order of the district judge, until the 18th of April, and on the
14th an order was passed showing that the assignees had filed
their bond in the penalty of $10,000.
On the 6th of May the
assignees informed the counsel for the petitioners that they would
not allow the use of their names in the'prosecution of' this appeal.
The petitioners therefore asked, in consideration of the surprise'occasioned to them by this information, and also upon the
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ground that an appeal from the order of the district judge in such
a case as that before him was not allowed by the act, that the court
would give them leave to file their petition now presented and
grant them appropriate relief.
Bradley T. Johnson, for petitioners.
Chandler and C. Dabney, for respondents.
CHASE, C. J.-The petition invokes the exercise of the jurisdiction of superintendence, conferred upon the Circuit Courts by
the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act, which provides that "the
several Circuit Courts within and for the districts where the proceedings in bankruptcy shall be pending shall have a general
superintendence and jurisdiction of.all cases and questions arising
under this act; and, except when special provision is otherwise
made, may, upon bill, petition, or other proper process of any
party aggrieved, hear and determine the case as a court of equity."
In the consideration of this petition it becomes necessary to
ascertain, if possible, the nature and extent of the jurisdiction
thus conferred.
It is clear that it must e exercised over proceedings in bankruptcy already pending in the District Court, and it seems to be
a reasonable interpretation that it does not exte nd to decisions
of the District Court frbm which appeals may be "taken.
By the 8th section, appellate jurisdiction of such decisions was
conferred upon the Circuit Court in four classes of cases: 1st.
By appeal in cases in equity decided in the District Court under
the jurisdiction created by the act; 2d. By writs of error in cases
at law decided in the exercise of that jurisdiction; 3d. By appeal
from decisions rejecting wholly or in part the claims of supposed
creditors; and 4th. By appeal from decisions allowing such
claims.
In the first two classes of cases the appeal* or writ of error is
given to the unsuccessful party to the suit, whether in equity or
at law; in the third class it is given to the dissatisfied creditor;
in the fourth to the dissatisfied assignee.
The suits belonging to the first two classes of cases seem to be
those of which concurrent jurisdiction is given to the Circuit and
District Courts by the 8th section; for no jurisdiction of cases at
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law or in equity relating to the estate, rights, or liabilities of the
bankrupt is expressly given to the District Court elsewhere than
in the 3d clause of the 2d section; though this jurisdiction may
ne well enough held to be included in the general grant of the
1st section.
If this view is correct, and the jurisdiction of the District
Court under the act, spoken of in the 8th section, is the jurisdiction defined by the 3d clause of the 2d, the appellate jurisdiction by appeal and writ of error from decisions in the exercise
of that jurisdiction must be regarded as limited to suits at law or
in equity, by assignees against persons claiming adverse interests,
or -by such persons against assignees.
From these premises the necessary deduction is that the appellate jurisdiction, strictly so called, conferred upon the Circuit
Courts, is limited to these controversies between assignees and
the claimants of adverse interests, and to controversies between
assignees and creditor-claimants touching the allowance of claims.
But there must be, obviously, numerous decisions by District
Courts and district judges sitting at chambers which are not
included in either of these categories.
The order complained of in the petition is an example. It is
not a decree in equity; 'nor a judgment at law; nor a rejection
of claim in whole or in part; nor an allowance of a claim.
From this order, then, it is clear no appeal could be taken.
On this point there seems to have been a misapprehension both
of counsel and of the district judge; for an appeal was allowed,
though not in time; and, afterwards, the time for filing the appeal
bond was extended. Of this not ling more need be said now than
that the right of appeal, as given by the statute, can'neither be
enlarged nor restricted by the District or the Circuit Court. The
regulation of appeals is a regulation of jurisdiction. The Circuit
Court has no jurisdiction of any appeal in any case under the
Bankrupt Act from, the District Court, unless it is claimed, and
bond is filed at the time it is claimed, and notice of it given, as
required by the 8th section of the act, within ten days after the
entry of the decree or decision appealed from; or unless it is
entered at the term of the Circuit Court first held within and for
the proper district next after the expiration of the ten days from
the time it was claimed.
This is mentioned here only to correct the misapprehension
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which seems to prevail concerning the jurisdiction of this court
upon appeals.
Returning, then, to the order mentioned in the petition, and
finding it, as already stated, to be one from which no appeal can
be taken, the conclusion is inevitable that it is one which may be
reviewed in the exercise of the power of general superintendence,
or that it cannot be reviewed at all.
It may be said- that the superintending jurisdiction does not
extend to decisions of the District Court, or of the district
judge at chambers; and certainly if it does not extend to both,
it extends to neither; for the 1st section of the act gives the
same jurisdiction to the district judge at chambers as to the District Court. This construction would limit the revisory jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to that given in the 8th section.
- But it is plain that this construction is not the correct one. It
would indeed nullify the operation of. the most important clause
of the 2d section, for it would limit the superintending jurisdiction to the proceedings of assignees and registers; and these
seem to be already placed by the 1st clause under the supervision
of the District Court.
The better, and indeed, as it seems to me, the only construction
which gives due effect to all parts of the act relating to revisory
jurisdiction, seems to be that which on the one hand excludes
from the category of general superintendence -and jurisdiction
of the Circuit Court the appellate jurisdiction defined by the 8th
section; and, on the other, brings within that category all decisions of the District Court, or the district judge at chambers,
which cannot be reviewed upon appeal or writ of error under the
provisions of that section.
. The exercise of this general jurisdiction is not placed by the act
under specific regulations and restrictions, like the proceeding by
appeal or writ of error. It was doubtless thought most advisable
to -leave its regulation to the discretion of the court and to the
rules to be prescribed by the Supreme Court. As yet, the Supreme Court has prescribed no rule concerning it; nor has this
court.
In the case before us its exercise must depend on the sound
discretion of this tribunal. Unreasonable delay in invoking the
superintending jurisdiction should certainly not be allowed.

Nor,
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on the other hand, should such excessive rigor be exercised that
the ends of justice will probably be defeated.
Leave is given to file the petition, and other questions are
reserved until the coming in of affidavits; and in the mean time
let further proceedings under the order of the District Court be
suspended.

United States Circuit Court. Southern District of Ohio.
WILLIAM H. LANGLEY v. LEMUEL PERRY.
The Circuit Court under the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act has jurisdiction to revise the rulings and judgment of the District Court in proceedings in bankruptcy upon bill filed.
A general assignment of all a debtor's property for the benefit of his creditors,
is not necessarily a conveyance with intent to delay, defraud, or hinder creditors.
And where such an assignment is made with intent to secure an equal distribution
of all the debtor's projierty among all his creditors, it is not necessarily a conveyance of property with intent to defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt
Act.
To make such an assignment an act of bankruptcy, it must be made with intent
to delay, defraud, or hinder creditors within the meaning of the statute of 13
Elizabeth, or with intent to defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act.

THIs was a bill in equity, filed by Langley against Perry, to
revise and reverse an adjudication of bankruptcy, by the District
Court, on the petition of Perry against Langley. The bill set
out the proceedings in the District Court. At the hearing it was
agreed by counsel, with the assent of the court, that the complainant should amend his bill by making copies of all the proceedings in the District Court, including a bill of exceptions
embodying all the testimony, &c., part of the bill, to the end that
the whole case of Perry v. Langley, in the District Court, from
the filing of the petition, should be before the Circuit Court; and
thereupon the bill was so amended. The defendant, Perry,
demurred.
Langley was a resident of Gallia county, Ohio. Among other
creditors, he owed Perry, who brought suit against him, and
recovered a judgment at a term of the court commencing on May
27th 1867.
On the 25th of May 1867, Langley, being insolvent, made a
general assignment of all his property, in trust for all his cre-
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ditors. The assignees accepted the trust, and, on the 25th of May
1867, filed the deed in the Probate Court of Gallia county, under
the statutes of Ohio, and proceeded to administer the trust.
On the 17th of July 1867, Perry filed a petition against Langley in the District Court, setting forth the assignment, and claiming that it was made with intent to hinder and delay him in the
collection of his debt; and also with intent, by such disposition,
to defeat and delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act, and was,
therefore, an act of bankruptcy. Langley answered, denying the
intent charged. Perry proceeded to take testimony, and it is set
forth in the bill of exceptions. Langley offered no testimony,
and the case was heard upon the testimony offered by Perry only.
The District Court held the assignment an act of bankruptcy, and
declared Langley a bankrupt. The opinion of the judge is
reported in 7 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 429.
This bill was filed to reverse that judgment.
. D. Coffin, for Langley.
Nash & -Lincoln, for Perry.
SWAYNE, Circuit J., held' :1. That the Circuit Court, under the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act, had jurisdiction in this manner to revise and correct
and reverse the rulings and judgment of the District Court in proceedings in bankruptcy.
2. That where a creditor is about to recover a judgment against
his debtor in Ohio, and the debtor makes a general assignment of
all his property, for the benefit; of all his creditors, before the
judgment is rendered, such conveyance is not necessarily a conveyance with intent to delay, defraud, or hinder creditors.
8. And where such an assignment is made under like circumstances, with intent to secure an equal distribution of all the
debtor's property among all his creditors, it is not necessarily a
conveyance of property with intent to defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act.
4. To make such an assignment an act of bankruptcy, it must
be made with intent to delay, defraud, or hinder creditors within
I The opinion of Justice SwAYNE was delivered orally; .but we are furnished
with the above abstract by counsel, and are assured that it is reliable.-EDs. Am.
LAw REG.
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the meaning of the statute of 13 Elizabeth, or with intent to
defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act. It becomes
a question of fact. The innocence or guilt of the act depends on
the mind of him who did it, and it is not a fraud within the meaning of the Bankrupt Law, unless it was meant to be so. Here
the proof submitted in the case is clear that the assignment was
an honest act, and was not intended either to defraud creditors or
defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act.
The demurrer is overruled; judgment of the IDistrict
Court reversed, and the cause remanded to the District Court.
In the still later case of THomAs W.

Bankrupt Act, and may be declared a

FAnxIN v. Toux CnAWrORD, in the bankrupt, was sought to be reviewed on
same court, Justice SwAkTE affirmed
his ruling in the principal case, that an
assignment for the benefit of creditors
is not, ipso facto, an act of bankruptcy;
and that the Circuit Court would review
the adjudication of the District Court in
bankruptcy cases on the facts under the
supervisory power given by the act. In
this last-mentioned case the Circuit
Judge reviewed the testimony at some
length, and while dissenting from the
conclusion of the district judge that an
assignment was per se an act of bankruptcy, held the transaction in this case
to be such an act, because it was not in
fact an assignment of all the debtor's
property.
These cases, and the foregoing (Matter
of Alexander, ante, p. 423), are among
the few in which the supervisory powers
of the Circuit Courts have been passed
upon by a judge of the Supreme Court,
and the liberal construction given to
section 2, by the Chief Justice and Just-

appeal. Justice NELSON, of the Supreme
Court, held that the adjudication could
not be reviewed on appeal, and his
language would appear to favor a very
restricted construction of the power
granted by section 2; but, in connection with the foregoing decisions, it may
be understood as applying only to the
form in which the case was then presented.
In the Matter of John M. Reed, 2
Bank. Reg. 2, the Circuit Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, JJ. SWATNE
and SHEnHAx held that the supervisory
power was to be exercised by petition
and not by appeal.
In Ruddick v. Billings, 2 West. Jur.
275, Justice MILLEXI, of the Supreme
Court, expressed great doubt if an adjuication of bankruptcy could be reviewed
by appeal or writ of error under section
8, but was clearly of opinion that any
creditor -considering himself aggrieved
by the discharge of a bankrupt, could
ice SWATNE, renders this a very exten- be heard upon petition under section 2.
sive and important jurisdiction to which
The whole subject of the jurisdiction
perhaps the attention of the profession of the Circuit Court in bankruptcy, will
has not been very much directed.
be found elaborately treated by a very
In Ex parte O'Brien, 6 Int. Rev. Rec. distinguished Ohio"jurist, in an article
182, the decision of the District Court in our pages, ante vol. 7, X. S. p. 641.
that -a feme covert trader is within the
J. T. M.
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Supreme Court of California.
THE PEOPLE v. TYLER.
Where a statute authorizes but does not compel a party indicted to become a
witness in his own behalf, it is improper for the prosecution to comment to the jury
on the prisoner's refusal to offer himself as a witness, and the court should when
requested charge that no inference was to be drawn against the prisoner from his
refusal.
TEE opinion of the court was delivered by
SAWYER, C. J. (after disposing of some local points affecting the
regularity of the proceedings).-The highly important question in
the case arises under the Act of April 2d 1866, entitled "An Act
relating to criminal prosecutions," which provides as follows:
"Section 1. In the trial of all indictments, complaints, and other
proceedings against persons charged with the commission of crimes
or offences, the person so charged shall, at his own request, but
not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness, the credit to be
given to his testimony being left solely to the jury, under the
instructions of the court. Section 2. Nothing herein contained
shall be construed as compelling any such person to testify :"
Stat. 1865-6, p. 865.
At the trial the defendant did not avail himself of the right
conferred by this act to offer himself as a witness on his own
behalf. During the argument of the case, the District Attorney called the attention of the jury to the fact, that the defendant had not testified in his own behalf, and argued and
insisted before said jury that the silence of the defendant was a
circumstance strongly indicative of defendant's guilt. Defendanqt's counsel objected to this *course of argument, and requested
the court to require the District Attorney to refrain from urging
such inference, but the court declined to interfere, and intimated
that the law justified the counsel in the course pursued. The
District Attorney thereupon continued to urge before the jury,
that the silence of the defendant was a circumstance tending
strongly to prove his guilt, and the counsel for the prisoner excepted.
At the close of the argument of the case to the jury, the defendant's counsel asked the court to give to the jury the following
instruction: " The jury should not draw any inference to the
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prejudice of the defendant from the fact that he did not offer
himself as a witness in his own behalf. It is optional with a defendant to do so or not, and the law does not intend that the jury
should put any construction upon Iris silence unfavorable td him."
The court refused to give the instruction, and defendant excepted.
The action of the court in the premises is claimed to be erroneous.
The act under which the question arises, constitutes one of the
advances recently made by our legislation in the law of evidence.
The principle embraced in the act was first adopted in Maine, we
believe, and it has, as yet, so far as we are advised, found a place
in .the statutes of but few of the states. No decision under similar statutes has been called to our attention, and we are not aware
that it has been the subject of judicial construction. The policy
of such a statute has been considerably discussed by law writers
and others, and, to our minds, the strongest objection that has
been urged against it is, that it places a party charged with crime
in an embarrassing position; that even when innocent, a party on
trial upon a charge for some grave offence may not be in a fit
state of mind to testify advantageously to the truth even, and
yet, if he should decline to go upon the stand as a witness, the
jury would, from this fact, inevitably draw an inference unfavorable to him, and thus he would be compelled, against the humane
spirit of the common law, to furnish evidence against himself,
negatively at least, by his silence, or take the risk under the excitement incident to his position of doing worse, by going upon
the stand and giving positive testimony. The object of the statute
is undoubtedly beneficent. It was designed to afford a party
charged with crime, and who must necessarily be cognisant of the
true state of the case, an opportunity to controvert or explain
any fact that may appear to be against him. It was designed to
facilitate the attainment of truth, and to advance the ends of
justice, by opening the door under certain wise restrictions consistent with the humane policy of the law, not to compel a party
to criminate himself, to all the avenues and sources of truth.
We intimated our approbation of modern progress in the law
of evidence in some other particulars in the case of The People v.
Jones, 81 Cal. 573, and we are favorably disposed to. the act now
under consideration. We so intimated in the case of The People
v. -Yarrell, 81 Cal. 583. But while we are hopeful that future
experience will justify the wisdom of this important change in the
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law, we cannot deny that it has, as yet, not been in force sufficiently long to develop its practical workings. In order, however,
that the results may answer the expectations of those legislators
who adopted it, and the ends of truth and justice be promoted, the
statute must be examined, construed, and enforced by the courts,
in the same liberal and beneficent spirit that prompted its adoption, otherwise it will become an instrument of wrong and injustice,
if not of absolute and intolerable oppression; and in this spirit it
is our duty to construe and enforce it.
Upon an examination of the act we find that a person charged
with an offence, "shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be
deemed a competent witness." It is optional with him, then,
whether- he shall testify or .not; and section 2 provides, that
" Nothing herein contained shall be construed as compelling any
person to testify." This is but a re-enactment by the statute of
that provision of our. State Constitution, which says, no person
' shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself:" Art. I., sec. 8.
At the trial, by his plea of not guilty, the party charged denies
the charge against him. This is itself a positive act of denial,
and puts upon the people the burden of affirmatively proving the
offence alleged against him. When he has once raised this issue
by his plea of not guilty, the law says he shall thenceforth be
deemed innocent till he is proved to be guilty, and both the common law, and the statute, give him the benefit of any reasonable
doubt arising on the evidence. Now, if, at the trial, when, for all
the purposes of the trial, the burden is on the people to prove the
offence, charged by affirmative evidence, and the defendant is
entitled to rest upon his plea of not guilty, an inference of guilt
could legally be drawn from his declining to go upon the stand as
a witness, and again deny the charge against him in the form of
testimony, he would practically, if not theoretically, by his act
declining to exercise his privilege, furnish evidence of his guilt
that might turn the scale, and convict him. In this mode he would
indirectly and practically be deprived of the option which the law
gives him, and of the benefit of the provisions of the law and the
Constitution, which say, in substance, that he shall iot be compelled to criminate himself. If the inference in question could be
legally drawn, the verT act of exercising his option as to going
upon the stand as a witness, which he is necessarily compelled by
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the adoption of the statute to exercise one way or the other, would
be, at least, to the extent of the weight given by the jury to the
inference arisingfrom his declining to testify, a crimination of
himself.
Whatever the ordinary rule of evidence with reference to inferences to be drawn from the failure of parties to produce testimony
that must be in their power to give may be, we are satisfied that
the defendant, with respect to exercising his privilege under the
provisions of the act in question, is entitled to rest in silence and
security upon his plea of not guilty, and that no inference of guilt
can. be properly drawn against him from his declining to avail
himself of the privilege conferred upon him to testify on his own
behalf; that to permit such an inference, would be, to violate the
principles and the spirit of the Constitution and the statute, and
defeat, rather than promote, the object designed to be accomplished by the innovation in question.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the court erred in permitting
the District Attorney to pursue the line of argument to which
objeQtion and exception were taken, and intimating its approbation of the ground taken, and, especially after what had transpired,
in refusing the instruction asked on behalf of defendant for- the
purpose of correcting any erroneous view that might have- been
impressed on the minds of the jury. -We think such instruction
proper in all cases where the defendant desires it.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial ordered.

Court of Appeals of Kentucy.
JOHN D. ELLIOTT,

APPELLANT, V.

HENRY NICHOLS;

APPELLEE.

A conveyance to husband and wife and their heirs prior to.1850, constituted in
Kentucky, as at common law, an estate by entireties, which neither husband nor
wife could sever -or make liable for debts as against the other.
The statute of 1850, -abolishing the right of survivorship and turning the estate
into a tenancy in common, is not retrospective.
Semble, the legislature would have had no constitutional power to. divest parties
of such right of survivorship acquired by a conveyance in entireties before the passage of the statute.

APPEAL from Nelson Circuit Court.
VOL. XV]I.-28

ELLIOTT v. NICHOLS.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
0. J.-January 3d 1837 Henry Nichols conveyed to
his daughter Elizabeth, and her husband, Henry Nichols, certain
lands to them and their heirs for ever, which, together with other
lands the husband mortgaged, March 9th 1865, to appellants, to
secure various specified debts.
Mrs. Elizabeth Nichols died in the year 1861, leaving appellees
as her children and heirs at law, who resist the foreclosure of the
mortgage on one-half of the land so conveyed by their grandfather to their father and mother, claiming that by the Revised
Statutes enacted in the year 1850, the right of survivorship was
abolished in such estates, and they held as tenants in common,
and therefore by moieties- with a mutual right of curtesy and
dower of the survivor in the half of the other, hence they insist
that the creditors could only foreclose as to the life interest of their
father as tenant by the curtesy in their mother's half of said
land. Sect. 14, art. 4, ch. 47, 2 Stant. Rev. Stat. 27, provided
that "where any real estate or slave is conveyed or devised to
husband and wife, unless a right of survivorship is expressly provided for, there shall be no mutual right to the entirety by survivorship between them, but they shall take as tenants in common,
and the respective moieties be subject to curtesy or dower with
all other incidents to such a tenancy."
By sect. 14, ch. 21, 1 Stant. Rev. Stat. 262, it is declared that
"no part of this revision is retrospective unless expressly so declared." And although the language and construction of the
enactment relative to such estates might be construed to apply to
existing titles, and abolish the right of survivorship between husband and wife, and change the estate from an entirety into one in
-common, yet as the language is not necessarily expressive of such
an intention, we would not hasten to give it a retrospective application, especially in view of a want of constitutional authority in
the legislature to so enact. Husband and wife having but one,
united legal existence, conveyances to them by the common law
which remained in force in this state until our revision of 1850,
created a peculiar estate in which both held the entire title, consequently the death of either conferred no new estate or title on
the other, but only destroyed the possibilit, of the decedent's
survivorship, in which case that one would have remained the sole
WILLIAMS,
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owner. By the common law joint tenants could destroy the right
of survivorship by the sale of their respective portions, or by
compelling, as they could do, partition, whilst this peculiar
tenancy of husband and wife could not be destroyed by the sale of
either, nor could partition be compelled by any means known to
the law.
This possibility of survivorship, and contingent possibility that
the unity between joint tenants would not by any means be destroyed, and the right of survivorship remain, was not such a present vested interest as created or constituted an estate, either
leviable by execution, subject to decretal sale, or even vendible
and assignable by the tenant himself, but was a mere legal incident
to such estate, as a rule of law, which the legislature might abolish. So in Edwards v. J'arrick,5 Davies 668, the Court of
Errors of New York, in able, exhaustive opinions by Judge
BEARDSLEY and others, held that when a father had devised
two separate tracts of land severally to his sons Joseph
and Medcif and their heirs and assigns, but should either die
without lawful issue his tract to go to the survivor, and left the
two sons executors, with others, and they, as executors, mortgaged
Joseph's tract, and Joseph having afterwards died without issue, and
subsequently Medcif died leaving issue, who brought ejectfaent
against the mortgagee. in possession, it was held that by the
father's will Joseph took a determinable,. qualified, or base fee in
the land primarily devised to him, which was certainly effective
as an estate for life, but that no present estate or interest therein
passed to Medcif during JQseph's life, his interest being what the
law terms a mere possibility of future interest, which, feing
neither an estate, interest, nor right in esaw, was incapable of
being transferred by grant or assignment at law.
In equity, however, when a party, for a valuable consideration,
has sold such a possible interest, he will be deemed the trustee
of, his vendee, and, when he gets the title, as holding it for him,
and compelled to release it to the vendee.
But, as said by the Court of Appeals of Virginia in Thornton
v. Thornton, 3 Randolph 183, all the books agree una voce that
husband and wife not only cannot compel each other to make
partition, but, even if they concur in the wish, they have not the
power to sever the tenancy.
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It is a sole, and not a joint, tenancy. They have no Moieties.
Each holds the entirety. They are one in law, and their estate
one and indivisible. If the husband alien, if he suffer a recovery,
if he be attainted,-none of these will affect the right of the wife,
if she survive him. Nor is this by the jus acciescendi. There is
no such thing between them. That takes place where, by the
death of one joint tenant, the survivor receives an accession,
something which he had not before-the right of the deceased.
But as between husband and wife the survivor takes nothing from.
the decedent, acquires no new title, nor interest, nor estate thereby,
but takes by the original conveyance the whole, because invested
thereby with the entire estate. The survivor gets the entire
estate by virtue of the title, being in him, or her, by the original
conveyance, but rid of the possible contingency of the other surviving and retaining the estate because likewise so invested in
that party. It is plain, therefore, that the husband had the entire
title to this land by the original conveyance in the year 1837 ; so
had his wife; and had she survived him she would have retained
it, and neither the husband, nor his heirs or assigns, nor the mortgagees, nor even the purchasers under a decretal sale foreclosing
the mortgage, would have held against* ier. Nor can her heirs
clainh or hold any portion of the land as against the surviving
husband or his assigns, but the whole tract should have been
ordered to be sold in payment of the mortgage-debts, or a sufficiency for said purpose. As the entire title and estate was vested
in both the husband and wife, the legislature could not have
divested any portion of the title, and, we must presume, did not
intend to do so, but that as a rule of property, and a declaration
of the legal effect of such deed subsequently made and the legal
xights of the parties thereunder, said statute was enacted. The
numerous cases recognising the common-law rules as to such conveyances by this court need not be referred to, all harmonizing
as they do with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.

